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According to the traditional account, Congress has the “necessary 
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments” by the 
president.1 As commentators have recognized, however, the traditional 
account does not match reality. Individuals in Washington, D.C., are more 
interested in fighting for their political party than for their branch of 
government,2 and the essentially reactive legislative branch lacks the capacity 
to respond to a rapidly changing policy environment.3 But the traditional 
account suffers from a more basic flaw. The president can decide whether or 
not to cooperate with Congress on a situation-by-situation basis. By 
contrast, Congress’s tools for disciplining the president, such as 
impeachment, typically preclude mutually beneficial cooperation between 
the branches across a broad set of situations. Since a prolonged collapse in 
cooperation would be costly to Congress, it will often not be worthwhile for 
Congress to respond to presidential provocations. 
This Essay uses a simple game to show how a player with the ability to 
make situation-by-situation decisions can outperform a player with less 
flexibility. It then uses real world examples to map the game onto the reality 
of interactions between the president and Congress. Finally, the Essay 
explores the possible use of unusual institutional arrangements to address 
this power imbalance. 
I. INTRODUCING THE GAME 
Consider a simple game played by two rational actors, Peter and Connie. 
Peter and Connie may each either “cooperate” with the other or “defect.” 
Each must choose a move without knowing what move the other player will 
 
 * J.D., May 2012, Harvard Law School. I thank Jonathan Meltzer, Eric Posner, and 
Adam Ehrlich Sachs for thoughtful comments and suggestions. 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 257 (James Madison) (Oxford University Press ed., 
2008). 
 2. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 443 (2012) (“[I]ndividual members of Congress tend 
overwhelmingly to act in accord with the preferences of their party.”). See generally Daryl J. 
Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 
(2006). 
 3. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 31 (2010). 
KOVVALI (DO NOT DELETE) 1/30/2014 1:23 PM 
74 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 112:73 
 
 
choose. If Peter and Connie both cooperate, each will get a payoff of 1. If 
Peter defects while Connie cooperates, Peter gets 2 while Connie gets 0. If 
Peter cooperates while Connie defects, Peter gets 0 while Connie gets 2. If 
Peter and Connie both defect, they each get an infinitesimal payoff, ε. The 
payoffs are summarized in Table 1 below: 
TABLE 1 
 
Connie Cooperates Connie Defects 
Peter Cooperates Peter gets 1 
Connie gets 1 
Peter gets 0 
Connie gets 2 
Peter Defects Peter gets 2 
Connie gets 0 
Peter gets ε 
Connie gets ε 
 
 If they play the game only once, both will defect. Connie will reason that 
if Peter is planning to cooperate, her best move is to defect, since 2 is better 
than 1. If Peter is planning to defect, Connie’s best move is still to defect, 
since an infinitesimal payoff is better than 0. Peter will reason the same way 
about Connie. As a result, both Peter and Connie will defect. This is the 
familiar “Prisoner’s Dilemma”: Peter and Connie would both do better if 
they simply cooperated, but the dynamics of the situation make defection the 
only rational move. 
The results become less bleak if Peter and Connie play the game 
repeatedly. In an iterated game, Peter and Connie have a wider range of 
strategies, including “Tit for Tat.” If Connie plays a Tit for Tat strategy, she 
will cooperate as long as Peter cooperates, but if Peter defects without 
provocation one turn, she will punish him by defecting the next turn and the 
turn after.4 As a result, Peter will reason that he can get 2 by defecting this 
turn only at the cost of getting essentially nothing for the next two turns. 
Therefore he will not defect this turn. If Peter selects a Tit for Tat strategy as 
well, Connie will reach a similar conclusion. They will both cooperate. 
Now let’s impose a limitation on Connie. If Connie defects this turn, she 
must defect in every subsequent turn. In other words, the only way that she 
can defect is by pulling a “Grim Trigger” that ends her ability to cooperate in 
this and every subsequent turn. With this change, the punishment that 
Connie can impose on Peter is more extreme than before. If Connie pulls the 
Grim Trigger, the most Peter will ever get in any later turn is an infinitesimal 
amount. 
But the change actually degrades Connie’s ability to retaliate. Suppose 
that Peter defects just once. Next turn, is it in Connie’s best interest to pull 
 
 4. This is actually a slight variant on the traditional “Tit for Tat” strategy. See Paul G. 
Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, 91 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1281, 1285–86 (2003). 
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the Grim Trigger? No. If she is locked in to defecting on every upcoming 
turn, Peter will defect on every upcoming turn because his infinitesimal 
payoff from the defect–defect scenario is better than his payoff of 0 from a 
cooperate–defect scenario. This means that Connie will also get only an 
infinitesimal amount every upcoming turn. 
So if Peter defects once but plans to cooperate occasionally in the future, 
Connie would be better off refusing to pull the Grim Trigger. If she refuses, 
Peter may occasionally cooperate and let her pick up a payoff of 1. If she 
does pull the Grim Trigger, Peter will never cooperate and Connie will be 
limited to earning the infinitesimal amount forever. Recognizing that it is 
not in Connie’s best interests to pull the Grim Trigger in response to every 
provocation, Peter will engage in occasional defections and will get away 
with it. Connie will only retaliate if she becomes convinced that Peter is the 
type of player who will defect continuously. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 
Enough games. In certain respects, the relationship between Congress 
and the president is like the last version of the game played by Connie and 
Peter. In many areas, Congress and the president obtain mutually desirable 
outcomes through cooperation. In those areas, the president can sometimes 
seize additional benefits at Congress’s expense by defecting in an individual 
case. By contrast, Congress lacks the flexibility to respond by defecting in a 
single case. Its tools for disciplining the president tend to make cooperation 
impossible across a large number of cases. For example, if Congress attempts 
to impeach the president, there will be no further cooperation between 
Congress and the president, and thus no joint benefits, for an extended 
period. As a result, even if Congress is unified and rational and sees itself as 
locked in a struggle with the president, it still will not punish the president 
for every defection. 
These points hold true across a broad range of substantive areas. For 
example, to punish a person under a criminal law, Congress must cooperate 
by passing the law and the president must cooperate by prosecuting. 
However, the president can defect by refusing to prosecute particular cases 
for his personal political gain.5 Congress can retaliate by impeaching the 
 
 5. The Obama Administration’s decision not to enforce certain immigration laws 
against certain especially sympathetic individuals may be one example of such behavior. 
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, 
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs. & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (June 15, 
2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-
individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (outlining the policy of exercising “prosecutorial 
discretion” to limit enforcement of “immigration laws against certain young people who were 
brought to this country as children and know only this country as home”). 
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president or by refusing to enact reform laws that it and the president both 
want, but both options would entail the end of cooperation between the two 
players. An impeachment would consume both branches for months or even 
years. If Congress refuses to enact a reform bill that Congress itself wants, 
Congress denies itself the benefits of cooperation under its preferred, 
reformed regime. Given the costs of its retaliatory options, it could easily be 
irrational for Congress to retaliate. 
Control over the military offers another example. Congress cooperates 
with the president by appropriating funds to maintain a powerful military. 
The president cooperates with Congress by using force only in 
circumstances where Congress would approve and defects by using force in 
circumstances where Congress would be skeptical or openly hostile.6 
Congress can discipline the president by defecting either before or after the 
president defects. Ex ante, Congress can discipline the president by refusing 
to fund the military at levels that would permit it to act without additional 
congressional appropriations. This would force the president to go to 
Congress to obtain the money required for each desired mission.7 But in this 
scenario, Congress would be denied the benefit of a well-prepared military 
long into the future. In effect, Congress would have locked itself into a 
“defect” strategy for many years to come. Ex post, after the president has 
used force despite Congress’s disapproval, Congress can defect by 
attempting to impeach the president. As already noted, however, 
 
 6. It is also possible for the president to defect by refusing to take military action 
despite Congress’s preference that he use force. But there are good reasons to believe that this 
type of defection will be relatively rare, since the president is more likely to support the use of 
military force than Congress. “James Madison said as much when he wrote, ‘The constitution 
supposes, what the History of all Gov[ernments] demonstrates, that the Ex[ecutive] is the 
branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it.’ ” Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, 
The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 299, 313 (2008) 
(quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in THE REPUBLIC OF 
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776–
1826, at 1031–32 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995)) (alterations in original). While history does 
offer counterexamples, these instances appear disconnected from the modern pattern of 
presidents that are “more hawkish than Congress.” J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 27, 85 (1991). In any event, Congress’s ability to force the president into a war he does not 
want is probably even more limited than its ability to keep the president out of a war he 
supports. There are few obvious mechanisms tailored to compelling action, and the cost of 
attempting impeachment would only go up in the context of a foreign policy crisis. But see 
Charles Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President Step up a War?, 71 LA. L. REV. 391 (2011) 
(arguing that mechanisms discussed below, including congressional hearings and specific 
legislation, can be used to goad the president into being more aggressive in his conduct of a 
war). 
 7. The Constitution itself imposes similar discipline by requiring that spending for the 
armed forces must be reauthorized by Congress every two years. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 12. 
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impeachment is an imperfect mechanism. Congress could also attempt to 
cut off funds. But this would only work if the presidential action is ongoing 
(as opposed to a one-off measure like a punitive airstrike) and if Congress is 
prepared to pay the policy and political price of failing to support the troops. 
Full support is often the least-bad policy once forces have been committed, 
and Congress would bear substantial political costs if it declined to support 
forces deployed abroad. Historically, the potency of these considerations has 
compelled Congress to go along with various presidential adventures that it 
did not approve of.8 
Of course, Congress could attempt to respond to a particular 
presidential misadventure with targeted legislation. But this approach also 
faces problems. If Congress were not relatively unified in its opposition, it 
would be unable to overcome a presidential veto. Even if Congress could 
overcome a presidential veto, all it would have produced is legislation. 
Congress would still have to enforce that legislation if it were defied.9 
Congress would face many of the same difficulties in enforcing its specific 
legislation as it faced in disciplining the president in the absence of 
legislation. For example, if it is not in Congress’s best interest to impeach the 
president in the absence of specific legislation, it may not be in Congress’s 
best interest to impeach the president even if specific legislation is in place. 
That said, specific legislation can change the dynamics of the situation. 
A president who is happy to defy or manipulate the terms of a general law 
may be unwilling to violate legislation that speaks specifically to the 
situation, even if the specific legislation does not directly increase the 
 
 8. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 
15 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 132, 162 (1999) (discussing historical examples); Jennifer Steinhauer, 
House Rebuffs Libya Mission; No Funds Cut, N.Y. TIMES June 25, 2011, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/us/politics/25powers.html?_r=0 (explaining that 
Congress refused to pass a bill that would limit financing for a Libya mission the House voted 
not to authorize). 
 9. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 87 (noting that a president may ignore a 
statute if he calculates that Congress will not retaliate when a statute is violated). Specific 
legislation may make more of a difference in situations in which Congress does not have to 
enforce its legislation. For example, if the presidential action is subject to judicial review, the 
courts may enforce the legislation on Congress’s behalf. The existence of specific prohibitory 
language in a statute can affect the outcome of such cases. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes 
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its 
lowest ebb . . . . Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by 
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.”). However, such situations are relatively 
rare “[b]ecause disputes about the outer limits of presidential power to keep the nation safe 
and to manage international affairs seldom ripen into justiciable controversies” that the courts 
can adjudicate. Richard H. Fallon, Interpreting Presidential Powers, 63 DUKE L.J. 347, 349 
(2013). 
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likelihood of formal sanction.10 This direct effect is reinforced by an indirect 
signaling effect. By violating specific legislation, the president might signal to 
Congress that he is the type of player who will defect constantly rather than 
just occasionally.11 A president who is inclined to cooperate would obey, so 
by disobeying, the president would signal that he is not inclined to 
cooperate. If Congress concludes that the president will defect constantly, it 
might rationally discount the possibility of future cooperation and pull the 
Grim Trigger via impeachment.12 Specific legislation can also alter incentives 
by shaping public opinion. If the public is more likely to be disturbed when 
the president violates clear legislation speaking to a particular international 
crisis, Congress may get a higher payoff from defecting via impeachment 
when specific legislation is in place.13 But presidential nimbleness limits the 
impact of this mechanism. The president can read the political winds to 
decide when and how to defect. Consequently, the president will not be 
disciplined as a result of public opinion unless he badly miscalculates. 
III. OTHER CONGRESSIONAL TOOLS 
Admittedly, Congress does have a few tools other than impeaching the 
president, passing legislation, and exerting control over appropriations. 
Congress can also grill executive officials in committee hearings and delay 
confirmation of the president’s nominees to various positions. But these 
tools have limits. A congressional hearing over a presidential defection 
would be most effective if the president’s chosen policy is unpopular. But the 
 
 10. Put differently, Holmes’s “bad man” model of the law may not be a useful model for 
the constraints that guide presidential decisionmaking. See Richard H. Pildes, Law and the 
President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1404 & n.69 (2012) (book review). 
 11. See id. at 1407–08 (noting that the president has an incentive to follow the law 
because it is a signal of his “credibility as a well-motivated user of discretionary power,” which 
in turn is crucial to his capacity to govern). There is good reason to believe that Congress and 
the public are attuned to signals of the president’s type, even apart from the practical 
consequences of the signaling action. President George W. Bush’s use of presidential signing 
statements provoked substantial outcry in Congress, despite the fact that signing statements do 
little other than reveal the president’s attitudes about the legislation and about presidential 
prerogatives. See Developments in the Law—Presidential Authority, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 
2071, 2086–87 (2012). 
 12. These effects can be heightened by a process of adverse selection. An increased risk 
of congressional retaliation will lead a president who is slightly inclined to be uncooperative to 
feign a cooperative nature. This means that when a president defects, he is signaling that he is 
strongly inclined to be uncooperative. This stronger signal further increases the risk that 
Congress will retaliate if the president defects, and this increased risk will lead a president who 
is strongly inclined to be uncooperative to feign a cooperative nature. 
 13. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 88 (observing that there can be a “political 
cost” to violating specific legislation). 
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president has presumably chosen the policy because it is in his best interest. 
Since many of the president’s defections will be popular, at least with his 
political base, congressional hearings would merely offer the president 
another venue for touting his successes.14 Hearings on embarrassing 
presidential slip-ups can cause him real damage, but Congress’s capacity to 
punish the president for accidents should not be mistaken for a capacity to 
punish him for deliberately defecting when he rightly concludes that it is in 
his best interest to do so. 
Holding up executive appointments can also frustrate the president, but 
in many ways, it is simply the equivalent of denying an appropriation. 
Congress denies itself the benefits of cooperation—of a functional agency 
fulfilling its statutory mission—long into the future.15 Congress might 
employ these strategies when it is happy to find itself in a defect–defect 
equilibrium, as when the current Congress disagrees with the policies 
enacted by previous Congresses.16 But it is not a workable approach for 
encouraging the president to cooperate. Besides, Congress often hurts itself 
as much as it hurts the president when it holds up a nominee. For example, 
Congress is not going to let the position of director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) sit empty for a long period; allowing the 
nation’s intelligence apparatus to spiral into chaos is bad for everyone. 
 
 14. See id. (noting that the president is unlikely to suffer political damage from illegal 
action if the action is popular). 
 15. The observations in the text may not extend to judicial nominees. Certain executive 
agencies are not able to take action, let alone successfully complete their statutory missions, if 
they have unfilled vacancies in key positions. See, e.g., New Process Steel, L.P. v. Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2640–42 (2010) (the National Labor Relations Board cannot 
function without a quorum of three members). By contrast, courts will generally continue to 
hear and resolve cases even when they are severely understaffed. As a result, there may be less 
cost to Congress in delaying or rejecting judicial nominees. On the other hand, the costs that 
Congress can impose on the president by opposing judicial nominees may be lower as well. 
When Congress delays or rejects executive nominees, it denies the president the ability to staff 
the government and may even make it impossible for the president to satisfy his constitutional 
obligation to “take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art II § 3; see 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a 
Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 955 (2013) (suggesting that appointment of 
executive officers is more central to the president’s core responsibilities than appointment of 
judges). Executive appointees are also more amenable to control by the president and less 
constrained in their ability to adopt positions that advance the president’s agenda. See Matthew 
C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice 
Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1047–48 (2006). Executive appointees 
can thus be more valuable to the president than judicial appointees. While it may be less costly 
to Congress to refuse to confirm a nominee to a judicial post than to an executive post, it is also 
less of a punishment to the president. 
 16. This point explains recent stretches of congressional inaction over presidential 
nominees to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the National Labor Relations Board, 
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 
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These last few points may seem inconsistent with recent experience. In 
February 2010, Senator Richard Shelby placed a “blanket hold” on dozens of 
President Obama’s nominees in order to pressure the Obama 
Administration on a Defense Department contract that could have proven 
lucrative for his state.17 In March 2013, Senator Rand Paul filibustered 
President Obama’s nominee for CIA director to draw attention to the 
Obama Administration’s positions on the targeted killing of Americans.18 
But individual legislators made these decisions. The decisions do not appear 
to have been optimal for Congress as a whole, or even for the legislators’ 
political parties.19 
However, behavior like Shelby’s and Paul’s suggests a potentially 
winning strategy for Congress, and for Connie. Connie’s essential problem is 
that the threat to pull the Grim Trigger isn’t credible. Connie can threaten to 
pull the Grim Trigger if Peter defects, but one turn after Peter’s defection, it 
will not be in Connie’s best interest to pull the Grim Trigger and end the 
possibility of any further cooperation. Because it would not be in Connie’s 
best interest to pull the Grim Trigger, Connie will simply let Peter’s 
defection go. Foreseeing this, Peter will engage in occasional defections. But 
Connie could make her threats credible by delegating the power to pull the 
Grim Trigger to a third party whose incentives are different from hers. 
Imagine a third player, Cato, who lacks the power to affect Peter’s 
payoffs but derives a large payoff when Peter is punished for Peter’s 
defections. Connie might delegate her power to pull the Grim Trigger to 
Cato. If Peter were to defect, it would still not be in Connie’s best interest to 
pull the trigger on the next turn, but the decision would no longer be hers. It 
would be in Cato’s best interest to pull the Grim Trigger; Cato would 
exercise his delegated authority and pull it. Foreseeing this, Peter would not 
defect. This tool improves incentives for Peter not to defect by heightening 
the risk of a defect–defect scenario.20 
 
 17. E.g., Scott Wilson & Shailagh Murray, GOP’s Shelby Blocking Nominees for Home-
State Pork, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2010, at A3, available at 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-06/politics/36816220_1_nominees-senate-house-
gop. 
 18. E.g., Ed O’Keefe & Aaron Blake, Rand Paul Launches Talking Filibuster Against John 
Brennan, WASH. POST POLITICS BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013 7:19 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/03/06/rand-paul-begins-talking-
filibuster-against-john-brennan/. 
 19. Wilson & Murray, supra note 17 (describing Senator Shelby’s move as a “rare 
political gift” to President Obama). 
 20. The concept of heightening risk to improve incentives has been explored in other 
contexts. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (2002). 
Commentators have also made the related point that Congress can improve its bargaining 
position relative to the president by introducing internal vetogates, as it does when it gives 
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The rules of the Senate may reflect a Cato approach. Congress delegates 
enormous power to individual senators, at least some of whom are likely to 
derive satisfaction from opposing the president in any given situation. 
Through such delegations, Congress can ensure that its power will be used to 
punish the president for defections, even in situations where Congress as a 
whole would be better served by declining to retaliate. However, there are 
significant problems with this approach. First, it only works if Congress 
cannot override the decisions of the individuals to whom it has granted 
authority. If Congress can override Senator Paul, Senator Paul cannot make 
Congress’s threats of retaliation more credible. Second, rules that empower 
individuals will end up empowering individuals on both sides of the 
ideological spectrum. If a liberal senator draws one “red line” and a 
conservative senator draws another, there is no guarantee that the president 
will be able to avoid a highly destructive confrontation. Third, rules that 
empower individuals will end up empowering the president’s allies in 
Congress. Instead of helping to block the president, such individuals could 
cause Congress to support the president’s choice or at least block Congress 
from taking action against the president.21 Fourth, the empowerment could 
spill over into substantive areas, which could cause perverse consequences. If 
Congress granted a veto to too many individuals and committees, it would 
be unable to pass legislation that adapts policy to a changing environment. 
As a result, Congress would likely be forced to make broad delegations of 
policymaking authority to the executive branch. This, of course, would have 
the perverse effect of empowering the president at Congress’s expense. 
For all their excesses, the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics 
in Government Act may have represented a more effective implementation 
of the Cato approach. Under the Act, an independent counsel could be 
appointed to investigate and prosecute high-ranking executive officials for 
violations of federal law.22 An independent counsel could play the role of 
Cato by focusing enormous attention and disproportionate resources on a 
presidential defection, even when Congress would have an incentive to just 
move on. Empowering an independent counsel does not require 
empowering other figures or gumming up the lawmaking process. 
But there is one final problem with the Cato approach, and it applies to 
independent counsels as well. In the real world, a person who derives a 
 
committees the power to veto legislation. ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 
338 (1996). 
 21. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 
15 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 132, 146 (1999). 
 22. Although the provisions theoretically allowed the attorney general to decline to seek 
appointment of an independent counsel, as a practical matter, the attorney general would likely 
have found it difficult to refuse a request from members of Congress. See Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 701–02 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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benefit from punishing the president for defecting is likely to derive a benefit 
from hurting the president regardless of whether the president cooperates or 
defects. When such a person is armed with the power to punish the 
president in response to defections, she is unlikely to be cautious in declaring 
that the president has defected and using her delegated power to punish him. 
The result is a trembling hand that often pulls the Grim Trigger in 
circumstances where it is not warranted. The Grim Trigger is expensive for 
both the president and Congress—indeed, it is so damaging to Congress that 
Congress would not pull it even in the face of a presidential defection if left 
to its own devices, and so it must resort to Cato figures to make its threats of 
retaliation credible. As a result, the cost associated with such unwarranted 
use of the Grim Trigger may be too great for the Cato approach to be a viable 
strategy. 
CONCLUSION 
This discussion has been descriptive, not normative. In the game 
between Peter and Connie, we have the intuition that the two of them ought 
to share by cooperating with each other. In the case of the president and 
Congress, intuitions are far less clear. The ability to make tailored one-off 
decisions in particular cases may be inherent in executive power, and the 
president may thus be justified in making that type of call as he sees fit. 
Conversely, perhaps legislative power is not properly exercised on a case-by-
case basis.23 But while the normative implications are contestable, the 
descriptive claim appears secure. Even if Congress were unified and sought 
to fight the president to a draw, it would lack the tools to do so. 
 
 23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (barring Congress from enacting a bill of attainder). 
